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THE EFFECTS OF ENTRY REGULATION 
ON BANK COMPETITION: THE CASE OF THE IRANIAN
BANKING INDUSTRY
Nasser Khiabani*
Institute for Management and Planning Studies 
Mehdi Hamidisahneh
Carlos III University of Madrid
Submitted September 2009; accepted January 2011
We focus on a modified version of the markup test to investigate the impact of entry regulation
on competitive conditions in the Iranian banking industry for the period 1996-2006. The
time interval under examination corresponds to an era characterized by substantial relaxation
of entry barriers and private bank penetration. To estimate Lerner indexes as a measure of
bank competition, we set up a simultaneous equation model for unbalanced panel data by
utilizing the stepwise maximum likelihood method. We find that concomitantly with the new
bank entries a pro-competitive change in the banking industry took place.
JEL classification codes: C33, D43, G21
Key words: bank competition, Lerner index, entry regulation, unbalanced panel
I. Introduction
The prediction and measurement of market power in the banking industry has
received increasing attention during recent years, mainly due to the processes of
regulatory reform in the ﬁnancial services industry. While signiﬁcant reform took
place among ﬁnancial service providers, the process was particularly concentrated
in the banking industry.
As in most transition economies, the priority of plan fulfillment determined all
financial transactions in the Iranian banking industry. Credit allocation was dependent
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on the central planner, and the banks had to support this allocation. The state-owned
banks settled all payments, absorbed private savings, and channeled them either to
the state budget or to state enterprises according to the central plan regardless of
fund repayments. 
The recent process of banking reform in the Iranian banking sector is conceptually
similar to the liberalization process followed by NIS countries.1 In the late 1990s
the Central Bank of Iran changed the entry policy from one where entry was totally
barred to one where the entry of non-bank credit institutions and private banks was
allowed. The regulatory reform and new bank entries provide a natural setting to
test differences in behavior before and after the change in the underlying institutional
structure. Specifically, we wish to know whether or not the removal of the substantial
entry barriers has made the highly concentrated banking sector more competitive.
The traditional Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) hypothesis, aiming to
infer competition conditions from concentration measures (e.g., the Herfindahl
index), views the degree of competition as an increasing function of the number of
firms in a market and a decreasing function of the average market share. Although
the SCP hypothesis of a positive relationship between concentration and profits can
be derived from oligopoly theory under the assumption of Cournot behavior, it is
not warranted under alternative models.2 Also, as noted by Shaffer (2004), even if
the SCP hypothesis is generally correct, there are reasons that limit the practicality
of the SCP approach in banking industry.
In contrast to the structural approach, the non-structural approach, based on the
so-called “New Empirical Industrial Organization literature”, focuses on obtaining
estimates of market power from the observed behavior of banks. One method, the
H-statistic developed by Panzar and Rosse (1977), uses the sum of the elasticities
of a firm’s revenue with respect to the firm’s input prices to identify the extent of
competition in a market. Under perfect competition, the H-statistic should be equal
to one, since any increase in input prices should lead to a one-to-one increase in
total revenues.
An alternative non-structural measure of competition, the markup test of Bresnahan
(1982) and Lau (1982), involves estimating demand and supply equations to capture
the divergence of price from estimated marginal cost. This method allows the
Journal of Applied Economics120
1 The Newly Independent States (NIS) are the twelve former Soviet Union republics that achieved
independence after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991. 
2 As noted by Shaffer (2004), alternative equilibrium concepts may predict different relation between
market concentration and competition.
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measurement of market power in terms of an index that ranges from 0 for perfect
competition to 1 for pure monopoly pricing. Since this test measures the actual
deviation from marginal-cost pricing, neither regulation nor possible disequilibrium
would alter the interpretation of the results.3 Where data are available, this technique
is superior to the Panzar-Rosse approach in terms of econometric identification and
ability of the estimated conduct parameter to map onto specific oligopoly solution
concepts. Moreover, the Panzar-Rosse statistic is not reliable for samples that are
not in long-run equilibrium (see Shaffer 2001).
The methodology we utilize is related to that developed by Bresnahan (1982)
and Lau (1982) and has been applied to banking data by Spiller and Favaro (1984),
Shaffer (1989, 1993, and 2001), Berg and Kim (1994), and Suominen (1994). Gruben
and McComb (2003) estimate an index of market power with aggregate data and
identify a change in competitive behavior due to privatization. Their results suggest
bank behavior that is consistent with competitiveness before the privatization but
with super-competitiveness after privatization in which banks run at levels of output
where marginal costs exceed marginal revenues. Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) also
applied the markup test with some variations to the Italian banking industry. They
found that competitive conditions have improved substantially after the
implementation of the Second Banking Coordination Directive, which allows banks
from European Union countries to branch freely into other EU countries.
Our paper contributes to the study of bank competition in three different ways.
First, the study analyzes the impact of entry regulation on competitive conditions
over a long period of time, 1996-2006. Second, there is an important and unattended
issue common to all of published works in this area and to which we direct our
attention in this paper. Namely, to the best of our knowledge, all the published
papers related to the issue of bank competition utilize time-series, cross-section, or
balanced panel estimation. Unbalanced panel estimation is more likely to appear
in banking sectors where some banks have dropped out of the market while new
entrants have emerged over the sample period. In this case, dropping observations
to make the panel balanced is very restrictive and may cause a substantial loss of
efficiency (see Baltagi and Chang 2000; Biørn 2004). Third, although there is an
extensive literature using non-structural measures to assess competition in many
developed and in some developing countries, there is a paucity of study on the
Iranian banking industry, hence the current paper fills this gap in the literature.
The Effects of Entry Regulation on Bank Competition 121
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data; see, e.g., Shaffer (2004).
jaeXV_1_12_jaeXV_1  09/05/12  18:13  Página 121
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In the next section we
provide an overview of relevant aspects of the Iranian banking sector and the financial
reform. Section III describes the model and methodology adopted to estimate market
power. Section IV introduces the data. The interpretation and discussion of the
results appear in Section V. Section VI concludes.
II. The Iranian banking industry: an overview
The reform of the banking sector and its transformation from a closed, state-
dominated, and poorly managed to a market-driven, open, and financially viable
one constitutes a major challenge of transition in Iran’s banking industry. The goal
was to create a stable and efficient private financial sector to attract investments,
mobilize savings, and allocate resources to their most productive use. 
Following the Revolution of 1979, all banks were nationalized. Iran’s laws
required that the banking sector be run according to the Islamic law, prohibiting
fixed interest payments on deposits. This left banks with limited degrees of freedom
to differentiate in the market. Moreover, entry in the Iranian banking sector was
barred, which effectively shielded the incumbents from competition. All banks,
regardless of size, geographic location, or individual efficiency, promised and paid
more or less the same mandated interest rates and no bank ever had to justify the
difference in the rates paid to depositors for short, medium, and long-term deposits. 
Since the Constitution permitted neither private nor foreign banks to participate
in the market, a solution the Central Bank of Iran thought of was to allow private
non-bank credit institutions to step in. These institutions were allowed to pay up to
4% higher interest rates than those paid by state-owned commercial banks and to
engage in a broad range of banking activities. 
To effectively restructure the Iranian banking system, as well as to increase
competition and diversification in the banking industry, the Central Bank of Iran
initiated a privatization program in 2000. Under this program, some of the non-
bank institutions were permitted to perform as private commercial banks. Although
so far only six licenses have been awarded, what is clear is that the new private
banks have grown spectacularly: Table 1 shows that the high concentration of deposit
and loan market shares by the state-owned banks declines over 2002-2006 and that
the market share by private banks gradually increases.
In this regard, Figure 1 depicts the trajectory of the Herfindahl index over the
period of our study. Recent reforms in the banking sector have reduced the
concentration of the Iranian banking system. This is in agreement with the decreasing
Journal of Applied Economics122
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share of public banks; as Table 1 shows, the share of assets in state-owned banks
fell from 97% to 86% over the 2002-2006 period. 
The private banks’ huge success is attributed to paying higher interest rates on
customer deposits, introducing innovative products and services, and efforts to
improve customer satisfaction. In addition, private banks displayed a better financial
performance. This improved performance is mainly due to the scrutiny of experienced
loan officers as well as various supervisory checks and balances and monitoring
systems. Although the contribution of private banks to the financial system is still
significantly lower than their state-owned counterparts, these banks are poised to
play an important role in forming the future banking environment in Iran. 
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Table 1. Banking sector, 2002-2006 period 
A. Deposits 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
State-owned 486226 600386 755140 938836 1234585
(98.7) (97.2) (94.8) (90.3) (84)
Private 6781 17790 41756 100901 231321
(1.3) (2.8) (5.2) (9.7) (16)
Total 493007 618176 796806 1039738 1465906
(100) (100) (100) (100) (100)
B. Loans 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
State-owned 389346 541372 758225 909585 1222787
(99.4) (97.8) (95.5) (91.6) (88.3)
Private 2348 11794 35152 83389 157922
(0.6) (2.1) (4.4) (8.4) (11.7)
Total 391694 553166 793377 992974 1380709
(100) (100) (100) (100) (100)
C. Assets 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
State-owned 858224 1197647 1459103 1835371 2280375
(97.3) (95.1) (91.2) (88) (85.7)
Private 24009 62233 141923 244438 378402
(2.7) (4.9) (8.8) (12) (14.3)
Total 882233 1259880 1601027 2079809 2658777
(100) (100) (100) (100) (100)
Note: figures in billion Rial (percentage shares in parentheses).
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III. Model and estimation procedure 
The basic model used in this paper is derived from that originally proposed by
Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982) and applied to the banking industry by Spiller
and Favaro (1984), Shaffer (1989, 1993, 2001), Berg and Kim (1994), Suominen
(1994), Angellini and Cetorelli(2003), and Gruben and McComb (2003). Our model
draws heavily on earlier work appearing in Angellini and Cetorelli (2003). 
In principle the markup test involves estimating a structural model with separate
demand and supply equations, which parameterize the markup of price over estimated
marginal cost as a measure of market power. In equilibrium profit maximizing banks
will choose prices and quantities such that marginal cost equals their perceived
marginal revenue. These choices depend to a large extent on cost considerations
and on the degree of competition in the market.
We consider a single-product case, a non-competitive industry in which incumbent
firms produce output Q at price P. Let qi be the quantity produced by bank i, i =
1,2,…,m, and . Let the inverse demand function be P = P(Q,z), where z
is a vector of exogenous variables affecting demand, e.g., prices or quantities of
other inputs and outputs used by the demanders of Q. Assuming banks are input
price-takers,4 the ith bank’s profit maximization problem is given by:
Σi iq Q=
Journal of Applied Economics124
















Figure 1. Herfindahl index for the Iranian banking industry
4 Although this model assumes banks are input price takers, violations of this assumption do not damage
the results in a serious way (see, e.g., Groben and McComb 2003). If banks have market power over
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(1)
where C(qi,wi) is the cost function for bank i, and wi is the vector of the prices of
the factors of production employed by bank i. 
The optimality condition corresponding to this profit maximization problem is
given by:
, (2)
where measures the departure from a perfectly competitive benchmark





is the conjectural elasticity of total industry output with respect to the output of the
ith firm, and ε~ is the market demand semi-elasticity to the price,
. (5)
It is possible to estimate both the supply and demand equations simultaneously
in order to identify θi and ε~. However, as noted by Angelini and Cetorelli (2003),
this approach increases the complexity of the estimated model. The alternative
method is to estimate as one parameter. In the latter case, dividing both sides
of equation (3) by individual bank prices, we obtain a Lerner index,
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deposits, in violation of the assumption, it can be shown that our result overstates the overall degree of
market power by misattributing any deposit power to the asset side.
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(6)
The Lerner index, measuring the mark-up of price over marginal cost, indicates
the market power of a firm. Values of L between 0 and 1 describe varying degrees
of imperfect competition or market power. Following this approach, we consider a
translog cost function:
, (7)
where Cit represents the cost for the i- th firm in the t-th period; qit represents the
output of the i-th firm in the t-th period, and wjit represents the j-th input prices of
the i-th firm in the t-th period (taking j = 1; 2; 3).5
Differencing equation (7) with respect to qit and substituting the result in equation
(3) yields the supply equation,
, (8) 
where λt’s are average values across different banks for a given year. 
Generalizing the Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) approach for measuring banking
market power, we assume that banks are arranged in groups according to the number
of years the banks are observed. The banks are observed in at least 1 and at most
P years. Let Np denote the number of banks observed during p periods. Let ip index
the i’th bank observed during p years (i = 1,…., Np; p = 1,….., P), and let t index
the observation number (t = 1,….., p). The total number of banks in the panel is
and the total number of observations is . Stacking the two
equations (7) and (8) for observation it, we have
(9)
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5 Most empirical implementations have employed a translog functional form to estimate bank’s cost
function. Unlike linear or quadratic forms, the translog form has the advantage of being directly compatible
with the theoretically required homogeneity conditions without employing additional parameters (Shaffer,
2004).
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where yit is a matrix of two variables whose derivatives are ln(Cit) and Pitqit, Xit is
a matrix of fourteen variables for the cost equation and five variables for the revenue
equation, and λt is the coefficient that measures market power (and only appears
on the revenue equation). Our model, therefore, is formally a system of two (G=2)
regression equations with a random individual effect in the first and a fixed time
effect in the second equation.
If, following Biørn (2004), we stack the p realizations from bank i in
, , , and let matrix Δi(p)
indicate that the bank i is observed in p periods, we can define λ = (λ′1,…,λ′T)′ for
the bank i, we can state that and then write (9) as:
(10)
(11)
where , ep is the (p×1) vector of ones, Ep = epe′p, Jp = (1/p)Ep, Ip is
the p dimensional identity matrix, and Kp = Ip – Jp.
To estimate the overall parameters , we have to apply a two-step
procedure to the log-likelihood function (LL) of all y’s conditional on all X’s. This
implies writing LL functions like these: 
(12)
(13)
initial values for Σu and Σα. In the first step of the procedure, we maximize LL
with respect to λ and β, and in the second step we use the solution of the first step
to maximize LL with respect to Σu and Σα. The joint estimation parameters
can therefore be obtained by iterating between the above two steps
until convergence is achieved.6
ε ε εi p i ip( ) ( ,..., )= ′ ′ ′1X X Xi p i ip( ) ( ,..., )= ′ ′ ′1y y yi p i ip( ) ( ,..., )= ′ ′ ′1
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6 For the complete derivation of the maximum likelihood procedure and its connection to GLS, see
Wangen and Biørn (2001) and Biørn (2004).
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IV. Data, input, and output definitions
The panel data for the period 1996-2006 was obtained from the Central Bank of
Iran. For each year in the 11-year data period, 10 state-owned banks were observed
over the whole period (N11=10); 5 private banks, and 1 state-owned bank were
observed over the 2001-2006 period (N6=6).7 Other non-bank credit institutions are
excluded because of a lack of reliable data. However, due to small market share,
excluding them would not pose a serious problem for our estimation. 
The time interval under examination is of particular importance since it spans
a number of years before and after new bank penetration, allowing us to test for
possible shifts in competition occasioned by that change. This data provides us with
enough identification power and degrees of freedom to pursue a thorough investigation
of bank competition in Iran during an important transition period for the first time.
For the empirical specification, we need to define inputs and outputs according
to some model of a banking firm. In order to define inputs and outputs, three main
approaches can be identified: (1) the value-added model classifies deposits as outputs
rather than inputs, assuming these products provide a valuable service for depositors
in the dimensions of safe storage of value, record keeping, and a means of payment.
(2) The user-cost model applies an empirical test to categorize inputs versus outputs.
(3) The intermediation model that is used by most studies on banking market power
(Klein 1971; Sealey and Lindley 1977). This model considers deposits as an input
(see Shaffer 2004).
The definition of inputs and outputs is not without problem. For example, for
deposits the financial costs and other liability costs are combined together. For
loans, financial incomes associated with profits and losses, are not separated in
financial accounts (see Fernandez de Guevara et al. 2005). Thus, in defining the
inputs and outputs of banks, we follow the intermediation model of banking.8 In
this model, a bank’s production function employs labor and physical capital to
attract deposits, and then uses labor and deposits to generate assets. The measure
of output (qi) is thus the total assets, and the price of output (pi) is the total interest
earned on assets plus revenue from services as a ratio to total assets. The price of
deposits is total interest paid on deposits divided by total deposits, wage rate is
Journal of Applied Economics128
7 Missing from the sample are two newly-established private banks, Pasargad and Sarmaieh, because
their data was only available since 2005.
8 This model has also been used in many empirical banking studies such as Shaffer (1993, 2001), Groben
and McComb (2003), and Angelini and Cetorelli (2003). 
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wage expenses divided by the number of employees, and the price of physical capital
is the ratio of total expenses on fixed assets to the value of fixed assets. Table 2
gives an overview of definitions and some descriptive statistics for the variables.
V. Empirical results
The estimation of parameters is obtained by applying (12) and (13) to system of
equations (10) described in Section III. Table 3 presents the Maximum Likelihood
estimation results with three different definition on the individual effects (random,
fixed and no effects). The model with error component effect is statistically more
efficient compared to other models. Table 3 also gives a measure of overall model
fit. The Schwartz Bayesian information criterion supports the random effect model.
Therefore, in what follows, we will use the more efficient results of unbalanced
panel estimation of the random effect model. Recalling that Lerner index is computed
as , an assessment of whether the indexes are statistically significant can be
obtained from the t-statistics on λt in equation (8). The price Pt is the average of
individual bank prices for a given year. 
The results of our estimation confirm that the competitive conditions had not
improved before new bank entries, but they improved significantly after 2000 (Figure
2). According to our estimation, the Lerner index has fallen steadily from 0.68 in
2000 to 0.42 in 2005. This increase in competition is consistent with what we find
using the Herfindahl Index (Figure 1). This is also consistent with the findings of
previous studies in many developed and transition economies. Angelini and Cetorelli
(2003) argue that Italian bank competition has improved substantially after the entry
of banks from other European Union countries. Unite and Sullivan (2003) conclude
that foreign entry and ownership structure, was effective in making Philippine banks
more competitive and efficient. Mamatzakis et al. (2005) report similar results for
the South Eastern European countries. 
The importance of our finding may be seen more clearly if we compare the
competitive conditions in the Iranian banking industry with other countries in the
region. Comparisons over time indicate that competition did not improve and, in
many cases, worsened over the period 2000-2006 within Middle East and North
Africa (MENA) countries.9 However, our findings show competition improved over
the same period for the Iranian banking industry. This is in agreement with Anzoategui
λt
tP
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9 See Anzoategui et al. (2010) for the Lerner index in MENA countries over 1994-2008 period.
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Table 3. Estimates of system (10)
Random effect model Fixed effect model Without individual effect
Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error Coefficient Std. error
s0 21 3.9** 0.6 12 -3.4 1.7
s1 1.1 0.36** 3.5 1.5** 1.5 0.69**
s2 -.38 0.54 -1.0 0.75 -0.70 0.53
s3 -3.8 0.7** 0.3 2.1 -0.90 1.2
s4 -.031 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.2 0.08**
s5 0.22 0.08** 0.34 0.23 0.04 0.028
s6 0.15 0.07** 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.07*
s7 -0.36 0.03** -0.19 0.22 -0.38 0.15**
s8 -0.22 0.08** -0.24 0.15* -0.25 0.086**
s9 -.54 0.11** 0.03 0.24 -0.26 0.14*
γ0 3.5 0.56** 0.53 1.8 0.65 1.1
γ1 -0.14 0.04** 0.03 0.14 0.05 0.08
γ2 -0.07 0.021** -0.2 0.06** -0.07 0.03**
γ3 0.02 0.043 0.038 0.066 0.018 0.04
γ4 0.26 0.048** 0.035 0.14 0.04 0.07
λ1996 0.031 0.014** 0.047 0.06 0.04 0.02*
λ1997 0.051 0.014** 0.061 0.05 0.05 0.02**
λ1998 0.052 0.013** 0.067 0.048 0.055 0.03*
λ1999 0.05 0.013** 0.068 0.041* 0.057 0.034**
λ2000 0.049 0.013** 0.073 0.04* 0.052 0.03
λ2001 0.05 0.014** 0.065 0.05 0.053 0.03*
λ2002 0.045 0.011** 0.06 0.021** 0.049 0.02**
λ2003 0.044 0.01** 0.07 0.02** 0.048 0.02**
λ2004 0.05 0.011** 0.073 0.024** 0.05 0.02**
λ2005 0.035 0.012** 0.058 0.025** 0.04 0.02*








Note: ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.1.
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et al. (2010) who find that easing entry regulations help explain differences in bank
competition across countries.
Comparing our results with other transitional and developed countries indicate
that, despite a significant reduction in the Lerner index over the 2000-2006 period,
the market power in the Iranian banking industry is still high. The Lerner index for
developed European Union countries is considerably lower than 0.3 (see Fernandez
de Guevara et al. 2005). However, the Lerner index for the Iranian banking sector
is constantly above 0.4 (Figure 1). This is also considerably higher than the Lerner
index for other countries in the MENA region (see Anzoategui et al. 2010).
The decline in the Lerner index in recent years implies that competition in the
industry might have increased after new bank entries. In this regard, bank spreads
(the difference between lending and deposit rates) have often been used as indicators
of bank competition. Higher spreads and margins are often interpreted to signal
greater inefficiencies and lack of competition in the banking sector. Concomitantly
with the decline in the Lerner Index, the spread between loan and deposit rates
dropped (Figure 3). The finding of improved competitive conditions after new
entries is confirmed by the inspection of price-deposit margins as a conventional
indicator of the ability of banks to price over marginal cost (Figure 4). Consistent
with the estimated Lerner indexes, the margin increased until 2000, the year prior
to the entry of new banks, and falls considerably thereafter.
We also evaluated the marginal cost for the Iranian banking industry using the
regression coefficients reported in Table 3, which shows a declining trend after new
entries (Figure 5). The decline in the marginal cost is consistent with findings of

















Lerner Indexes using alternative definitions of output and price 
Lerner Indexes excluding services revenue from output price 
Figure 2. Lerner index
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Claessens et al. (2001), which suggest that allowing new bank entry may result in
greater efficiency. Holding other factors constant, this should increase bank margins
and as a result reinforces our conjecture regarding improved competitive conditions
after 2000. 
A number of other factors may have had an effect on banks’ markups. As described
in Section III, the Lerner index is inversely related to the elasticity of the market
demand. Therefore, different demand conditions will lead to different market power
measures, even if the degree of competition remains unchanged. The elasticity of
demand for banking products may have changed over time as a result of the
macroeconomic environment and the emergence of non-bank suppliers of financial
services. In this regard, the finding of improved competitive conditions after 2000






































Figure 4. Price-deposit margin for the Iranian banking industry
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is reinforced by the results of Khiabani (2006), who estimated loan demand for the
Iranian banking industry and detected no evidence of coefficient instability for the
period 1995-2004.10
A check of the robustness of our core results relates to the definition of variables
in the model. The estimated competitive indexes are about the same whether output
is defined as total assets or whether instead it is defined as interest-yielding assets.
The general result is also robust when we account for revenues from services and
we treat deposits as part of banks output, thereby allowing for the possibility that
deposits are a relevant source of market power for banks (Figure 2).
VI. Conclusions
This paper investigates the impact of new entries on the competitive conditions in
the Iranian banking industry based on a modified version of the markup test. We
use unbalanced panel data on all state-owned and private banks over the period
1996-2006. In order to analyze the evolution of competitive conditions, we set up
a simultaneous equations model to estimate Lerner indexes as a measure of bank
competition, utilizing the stepwise maximum likelihood procedure introduced by
Biørn (2004).
The Effects of Entry Regulation on Bank Competition 135
10 Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) also note that, the concentration of the banking market may affect
pricing behavior and can thus account for the observed pattern of the Lerner indexes. In addition, the
economic cycles are likely to have an impact on banks pricing decisions.
Unfortunately, as our observation period is rather short, we cannot test whether this pattern could be the
result of a short-term cyclical effect or decreasing market concentration rather than a more fundamental















Figure 5. Marginal cost for the Iranian banking industry
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The overall picture emerging from the Lerner indexes confirms that average
mark-ups in the supply of banking products remained roughly unchanged before
new entries and declined significantly after that. Although there is a large literature
about the effect of foreign entry on domestic banking markets, our results are
important in the sense that they show that entry of a new private sector to make
domestic banks more competitive, may be as effective as a foreign entry policy.
This result is also robust to alternative definitions of bank output and price. 
This article provides significant evidence that bank competition in Iran is lower
than other transition economies. Comparing our results with the estimated Lerner
index of other transitional and developed countries indicate that, despite a significant
reduction in the Lerner index over the 2000-2006 period, the market power in the
Iranian banking industry is still high.
Our evaluation of banking sector competition suggests that, although in many
cases competition declined over the period 2000-2006 within MENA countries, the
competitive conditions have improved significantly in Iran since 2000. Nevertheless,
we cannot rule out that some events not explicitly accounted for in the analysis during
our sample period may have had a role in shaping the banking environment and the
observed pattern of our indicators of competitive conditions. External shocks, the
complex relationships between banking and other reforms, and the short time period
that has passed make the impact of regulatory reform on competition hard to measure.
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